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A Systemic Approach to
Managing Natural Disasters
Jaime Santos-Reyes
SEPI-ESIME, IPN, Mexico
Alan N. Beard
Heriot-Watt University, Scotland
inTroduCTion
Natural disasters may be defined as events that
are triggered by natural phenomena or natural
hazards (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, floods,
windstorms, landslides, volcanic eruptions and
wildfires). Throughout history, natural disasters
have exerted a heavy toll of death and suffering
and are increasing alarmingly worldwide. During
the past two decades they have killed millions of
people, and adversely affected the life of at least
one billion people. For example, recent disasters,
such as the quake that triggered a tsunami in the
Indian Ocean (United Nations Development Programme
[UNDP], 2005); earthquake in Pakistan
(Kamp et al., 2008); the Wenchuan earthquake in
China (Zhao et al., 2009) and more recently the
L’Aquila earthquake in Italy (Owen & Bannerman,
2009). On the other hand, hurricanes have
shown how vulnerable coastal communities could
be to such events. For instance, Hurricane Katrina
caused an estimated $35 to $60 billion in damage
aBsTraCT
The objective of this chapter is to present a Systemic Disaster Management System (SDMS) model. The
SDMS model is intended to provide a sufficient structure for effective disaster management. It may be
argued that it has a fundamentally preventive potentiality in that if all the subsystems (i.e., systems 1-5)
and channels of communication are present and working effectively, the probability of failure should
be less than otherwise. Moreover, the model is capable of being applied proactively in the case of the
design of a new ‘disaster management system’ as well as reactively. In the latter case, a past disaster
may be examined using the model as a ‘template’ for comparison. In this way, lessons may be learned
from past disasters. It may also be employed as a ‘template’ to examine an existing ‘disaster management
system’. It is hoped that this approach will lead to more effective management of natural disasters.
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-61520-987-3.ch001
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
and resulted in at least 1000 deaths in the United
States alone. More recently, on November 2007,
the State of Tabasco, Mexico, has been flooded
and it has been regarded as one of the worst in
more than 50 years. It is believed that the disaster
left more than one million people homeless. Finally,
it is thought that 2008 has been one of the
most devastating years on record; i.e., more than
220,000 people have been killed in 2008 alone.
The above stresses the importance of prevention,
mitigation and preparedness including evacuation
planning in order to mitigate the impact of
natural disasters. Disaster prevention includes
all those activities intended to avoid the adverse
impact of natural hazards (e.g., a decision not to
build houses in a disaster-prone area). Mitigation,
on the other hand, refers to measures that
should be taken in advance of a disaster order to
decrease its impact on society (e.g., developing
building codes). Finally, disaster preparedness
includes pre- and post- emergency measures that
are intended to minimize the loss of life, and to
organize and facilitate timely effective rescue,
relief, and rehabilitation in case of disaster (e.g.,
organizing simulation activities to prepare for an
eventual disaster relief operation).
Given the above, natural disasters present
a great challenge to society today concerning
how they are to be mitigated so as to produce an
acceptable risk is a question which has come to
the fore in dramatic ways in recent years. As a
society we have tended to shift from one crisis to
another and from one bout of crisis management
to another. There is a need to see things in their
entirety, as far as we are able. In relation to disaster
management, it becomes vital to see disaster risk
as a product of a system; to have a ‘systemic’ approach.
Despite this, very little emphasis has been
given by academe, international organizations,
NGO (Non Governmental Organizations), and
practitioners as to what constitutes and defines
an effective disaster management system, both in
terms of structure and process, from a systemic
point of view. This chapter presents a Systemic
Disaster Management System (SDMS) model. The
model is intended to help to maintain disaster risk
within an acceptable range whatever that might
mean. The model is intended to provide a structure
for an effective disaster management system. It
may be argued that it has a fundamentally preventive
potentiality in that if all the sub-systems
and channels of communication are present and
working effectively, the probability of a failure
should be less than otherwise. It is hoped that this
approach will lead to more effective management
of natural disasters
BaCkground
A great deal of effort has been made, by academe,
international organizations, and governments,
practitioners, to investigate and develop approaches
to address disaster risk. For instance,
during the 1990s the United Nations (UN) sponsored
the International Decade for Natural Disaster
Reduction (IDNDR) with the aim of reducing
losses caused by natural hazards (Annan, 1988).
The IDNDR Scientific and Technical Committee
identified five challenges to guide future programs:
(1) Integrate natural disaster management with
overall planning; (2) anticipate mega disasters
due to population concentrations; (3) reduce environmental
and resource vulnerability; (4) improve
disaster prevention capabilities of developing
countries; and (5) assure effective coordination
and implementation. The UN has also established
the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(ISDR) which serves as an international information
clearinghouse on disaster reduction, developing
awareness campaigns and producing articles,
journals, and other publications and promotional
materials related to disaster reduction; the publication
of “Living with risk: A global review of
disaster reduction initiatives” document (ISDR,
2004) is an example of these.
Other world organizations and countries have
published a vast amount of reports and publica3
A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
tions on the management of disasters; inter alia,
(Colombo & Vetere Arellano, 2002; ECLAC,
1991; Freeman et al., 2002; Jayawardane, 2006;
Kazusa, 2006; Kreimer & Arnold, 2000). Other
authors, such as Vakis (2006) discusses natural
disasters within the general framework of ‘social
risk management’ and highlights the complementary
role that “social protection” can play in the
formation and response of an effective strategy for
natural disasters management system. The author
proposes a number of “social protection” issues
that can be used in practice to address natural
disasters. On the other hand, it is now recognised
that ‘development’ and disasters have a close and
complex relationship. For instance, Mileti et al.
(1995) argue that “losses from natural disasters
occur because of development that is unsustainable”.
Similarly, Stenchion (1997) emphasises
that “development and disaster management are
both aimed at vulnerability reduction”. Some
authors, such as Cuny (1994) argues that development
is often set back by disasters and others
assert that post-disaster operations should take
into account a development perspective (see also
Berke et al., 1993; McAllister, 1993). The United
Nations Development Programme published the
document “Reducing disaster risk: A challenge
for development” (UNDP, 2004). The report in
a way summarizes the above points; i.e., natural
disaster risk is connected to the process of human
development and that disasters put development
at risk. Furthermore, it emphasizes that human
development can also contribute to reduction in
disaster risk. Finally, the report argues that disaster
risk is not inevitable and offers examples of good
practice in disaster risk reduction that can be built
into ongoing development planning policy.
Other researches have concentrated on several
issues regarding disaster management; i.e., organizational,
technological, early warning systems,
economic, emergency, etc. For instance, Granot
(1997) reviews the diverse cultures of different
organizations and a number of findings regarding
emergency services and suggests directions that
may improve inter-organizational relationships.
Kouzmin et al. (1995), on the other hand, discusses
the efficiency of disaster management policies and
programmes in Australia. The authors argue that
there are longstanding deficiencies in strategic and
operational planning and forecasting approaches;
they argue the need for more co-operation and
co-ordination between the various emergency
services, and finally, the authors discuss the development
of terrestrial and space technologies
which could be used in disaster management.
Other authors have concentrated their research
on emergency response preparedness issues. For
example, Wilson (2000) examines small group
training for those in charged with responding in
an emergency situation. Wilson argues that to
ensure both effective and efficient training it is
important to understand that people learn in different
ways. Cosgrave (1996) proposes that decision
making is part of all management tasks and that it
is particularly important for emergency managers
as they often need to take decisions quickly. The
author reviews some of the particular problems
of emergency decision and looks at the usefulness
of Vroom and Yetton’s decision process model for
emergencies (Vroom & Yetton, 1973), before proposing
a simplified problem classification based on
three problem characteristics. Cosgrave concludes
by reviewing a collection of “emergency” decisions
and analysing some of the common factors
to suggest a number of simple action rules to be
used in conjunction with the proposed simplified
decision process model.
Fisher (1998) has investigated the role of
the new information technologies in emergency
mitigation, planning, response and recovery.
The author illustrates the utility of multimedia,
CD-ROM, e-mail and Internet applications to
enhance emergency preparedness. Technologies
such as ‘remote sensing’, GIS (Global Positioning
System) and GPS (Geographical Information
System), also known as ‘3S’ technology, have been
used in the process of monitoring disasters. Murai
(2006) has developed a system for monitoring
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
disasters using ‘remote sensing’, GIS and GPS.
The author argues that the developed monitoring
system records the real status of damages due to
natural disasters and analyzes the “cause” of a
disaster and predicts its occurrence. Following the
tsunami disaster in 2004, the General Secretary
of the United Nations (ONU) Kofi Annan called
for a global early warning system for all hazards
and for all communities. He also requested the
ISDR and its UN partners to conduct a global
survey of capacities, gaps and opportunities in
relation to early warning systems (Annan, 2005).
The produced report, “Global Survey of Early
Warning Systems”, concluded that there are many
gaps and shortcomings and that much progress
has been made on early warning systems and
great capabilities are available around the world
(Egeland, 2006). However, it is argued here that it
may be not enough to have such systems without
concentrating on ‘wider’ issues, such a system
where an EWS may be just part of it.
More recently, there has been considerable
interest on the concepts of vulnerability and resilience.
However, there are multiple definitions
of these two concepts in the literature and there
is not an accepted definition (Klein et al., 2003;
Manyena, 2006). For instance, Cutter et al. (2008)
defines vulnerability as the “pre-event, inherent
characteristics or qualities of social systems that
create the potential for harm”. On the other hand,
numerous frameworks, conceptual models, and
vulnerability assessment techniques have been
developed in order to address the theoretical
underpinnings and practical applications of vulnerability
and resilience (Adger, 2006; Burton
et al., 2002; Eakin & Luers, 2006; Fussel, 2007;
Gallopin, 2006; Green & Penning-Rowsell, 2007;
Klein et al., 2003; McLaughlin & Dietz, 2008;
Polsky et al., 2007).
a sdMs Model
The Systemic Disaster Management System
(SDMS) model is intended to maintain disaster
risk within an acceptable range in an organization’s
operations in relation to disaster management.
It may be argued that if all the sub-systems
and channels of communication and control are
present and working effectively, the probability
of a failure should be less than otherwise; in this
sense the model has a fundamentally preventive
potentiality. Table 1 summarizes the main char-
Table 1. Fundamental characteristics of the SDMS model
1 A recursive structure (i.e., ‘layered’) and relative autonomy (RA)
2 A structural organization which consists of a ‘basic unit’ in which it is necessary to achieve five functions associated with systems 1
to 5. (See Figure1).
(a) system 1: disaster-policy implementation
(b) system 2: disaster- national early warning coordination centre (NEWCC)
(c) system 2*: disaster-local early warning coordination centre (LEWCC)
(d) system 3: disaster-functional
(e) system 3*: disaster-audit
(f) system 4: disaster-development
(g) system 4*: disaster-confidential reporting system
(h) system 5: disaster-policy
Note: whenever a line appears in Figure 1 representing the SDMS model, it represents a channel of communication.
3 The SDMS & its ‘environment’
4 The concept of MRA (Maximum Risk Acceptable), Viability and acceptable range of risk.
5 Four principles of organization
6 ‘Paradigms’ which are intended to act as ‘templates’ giving essential features for effective communication and control.
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
acteristics of the model and Figure 1 shows the
structural organization of the SDMS model.
recursive structure of
the sdMs Model
A Recursion may be regarded as a ‘level’, which
has other levels below or above it. The concept
of recursion is intended to help to identify the
level of the organization being modelled or being
considered for analysis. Figure 2 is intended to
show three levels of recursion for an organization.
System 1 at level 1 contains the sub-system of
interest; i.e., the ‘National Disaster Operations’
(NDO) which may be taken to be the highest level
of the system of interest (e.g., level of a country).
The sub-system is represented as an elliptical
symbol that contains two essential elements:
1. The ‘National Disaster Management Unit’
(NDMU) represented by a parallelogram
symbol which is concerned with the ‘disaster
risk management’ in the ‘National Disaster
Operations’ (NDO) of the organization, and
2. The NDO, which is where the disaster risks
are created, within system 1, due to the interaction
of all the processes that take place
within a country, region or community. There
may be other risks due to interaction with
the ‘environment’ (see section ‘the SDMS
& its environment’ for further details about
these). Note that the double arrow line connecting
(1) & (2) represent the managerial
interdependence.
Increasing the level of resolution of the system
of interest, i.e., NDO at one level below recursion
Figure 1. A SDMS model
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
1 will result in the ‘Zone A-Disaster Operations’
(ZADO) & ‘Zone B-Disaster Operations’ (ZBDO)
and this is shown at level 2 in Figure 2. It must be
pointed out that each of these sub-systems can be
de-composed into further sub-systems depending
on our level of interest. For example, ‘Region-1
Disaster Operations’ (R1DO), ‘Region-2 Disaster
Operations’ (R2DO) and ‘Region-3 Disaster
Operations’ (R3DO) are shown as sub-systems
of the ‘Zone A Disaster Operations’ (ZADO) at
level 3. In principle, each sub-system that forms
part of system 1 at level 3 can be de-composed
further depending on the level of interest of the
‘disaster management system’ modeller or analyst.
relative autonomy (ra)
The SDMS is intended to be able to maintain
disaster risk within an acceptable range at each
level of recursion, but this safety achievement,
at each level, is conditional on the cohesiveness
of the whole organization. The SDMS contains
a structure that favours relative autonomy and
local safety problem-solving capacity. Relative
autonomy means that each operation of system
1 of the SDMS is responsible for its own activity
with minimal intervention of systems 2-5. The
organizational structure of the SDMS allows
decisions to be made at the local level. Decision
making is distributed throughout the whole or-
Figure 2. Recursive structure of the SDMS
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
ganization. This means that distributed decision
making involves a set of decision makers in each
operation of system 1 and at each level of recursion.
These decision makers should be relatively
autonomous in their own right and act relatively
independently based on their own understanding of
safety and their specific tasks. However, it should
be recognised that they have interdependence
with other decision makers of other operations
of system 1 (see Figures 3 & 4). Therefore, each
operation of system 1 should be endowed with
relative autonomy so that the organizational safety
policy can be achieved more effectively. Relative
autonomy must not be confused with isolation;
it must be within an adequate system of control
and communication.
sTruCTural organizaTion
of The sdMs Model
The structural organization of the SDMS model
consists of a ‘basic unit’ in which it is necessary
to achieve five functions associated with systems
1 to 5. Systems 2 to 5 facilitate the function of
system 1, as well as ensuring the continuous adaptation
of the disaster management system as a
whole. The operations identified at recursion 2 (see
Figure 2) have been represented in the format of
Figure 3. Disaster management system-in-focus at recursions 1&2
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
the structural organization of the model. Figure 3
shows what is called here ‘disaster management
system-in-focus’ at recursions 1&2; similarly,
Figure 4 illustrates the ‘disaster management
system-in-focus’ at recursions 2&3. It should be
emphasized that both Figures should be seen in
the context of Figure 2. Referring to Figures 1&3:
system 1: disaster- Policy
implementation
System 1 may be regarded as the core of the SDMS
model. That is, it is where all the daily activities
within an organization (i.e., country, region, community,
etc.) take place and therefore, it is where
disaster risks are created. How system 1 might
be broken down is a key question; for example,
it might be de-composed on a basis of geography
or functions. For the purpose of the present case
system 1 has been de-composed on a basis of
geography as shown in Figures 2, 3&4.
As illustrated in Figure 1, system 1 is interrelated
with systems 2, 3&3*; i.e., system 1 consists
of several subsystems or operations, such
as ZADO, ZBDO, etc. Table 2 presents some
examples of the information that flows through
these channels of communication.
system 2: disaster- national
early Warning Coordination
Centre (neWCC)
The function of system 2 is to co-ordinate the
activities of the operations of system 1. System
Figure 4. Disaster management system-in-focus at recursions 2&3
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
Table 2. Examples of the sort of information that flows through the channels of communication
Communication channel
(see Figure 1) Description/Examples
System
1
System 1 to System 2
channel
Information about the maintenance programmes of physical infrastructure, such as early warning
systems; training programme of evacuation of the population, etc.
System 1 to System 3
channel
Information about: the lack of maintenance of the physical infrastructure; compliance and enforcement
of the legal and regulatory requirements; lack of forecasting systems; the need of new methodologies
for disaster risk identification, analysis and evaluation; the need to improve technologies, for
example, to control flood, etc.
System 1 to System 3*
channel
Compliance of public and private buildings with codes and standards as well as with land use plans;
whether the planned performance associated with the population’s response to an emergency (e.g.,
the effective response of the people, fire-fighters and police in an exercise based on the scenario of
an earthquake occurring) is being achieved or not.
System
2
System 2 to System 1
channel
A wide range of stakeholders need to be coordinated in the operations of system 1; for instance at
government level this means ensuring cross-departmental co-ordination; across society as a whole it
requires better links between the NGOs, the private sector and academia, etc. Coordination amongst
the main actors involved in the early warning chain to provide optimum conditions for informed
decision-making and response actions.
System 2 to System 3
channel
Malfunctioning or failure of a local early warning system (EWS); deficiencies on the channels of
communication between forecast and the intended recipient; i.e., the people from the communities, etc.
System
2*
System 2* to System 1
channel
Monitoring of data related to any particular sensor system; e.g., ocean bottom pressure sensors buoys,
tide gauging, etc. The communications may be achieved via wire line, wireless, satellite, etc.
System 2* to System 2
channel
If a deviation from an accepted criterion occurs then this is reported quickly to system 2.
System
3
System 3 to System 1
channel
Resource allocation for disaster reduction; i.e., financial, human, technical, material; legal and regulatory
requirements; i.e., laws, acts, regulations, codes, standards. For example, national disaster risk
reduction policies; standards (e.g., public and private building codes and standards); education and
training programmes: e.g., inclusion of disaster reduction at all levels of education (curricula, education
material), national and local training programmes; public awareness programmes, etc.
System 3 to System 2
channel
The performance of early warning systems,; the population’s awareness on how to react in case of
an earthquake, hurricane, etc.
System 3 to System 3*
channel
The population’s safety culture, etc.; the adequacy of the design and construction of public and private
houses; the adequacy of the training of evacuation programmes, etc.
System 3 to System 4
channel
System 3 communicates its needs to system 4; i.e., information about new developments on risk assessment
analysis techniques, new technologies, reassessment of process changes, new development
of means of escape, etc.
System
3*
System 3* to System 1
channel
Inadequacy of the design and construction of physical infrastructure; inadequacy of the critical infrastructure;
lack of maintenance of the physical infrastructure; deficiencies in the land use planning, etc.
System 3* to System 3
channel
Deficiencies in the design and construction of public and private houses; deficiencies of the population
on how to react in case of a natural hazard; i.e., an earthquake, etc.; lack of training of evacuation
programmes, etc.
System
4
System 4 to System 3
channel
Research programmes aiming to risk reduction; new methods in disaster risk identification and assessment;
new technologies aiming to improve the physical and technical measures, for example,
flood control techniques, soil conservation practices, retrofitting of building, etc.; modern methods
of monitoring, e.g., crop production, etc.
System 4 to System 5
channel
System 4 could, for example, communicate to system 5 about: the new technologies and regulations
related to the design of buildings identified in the ‘environment’; the development of new technologies
related to the prediction of earthquakes; new techniques in order to improve the flood control, etc.;
the development of new tools for risk assessments that reflect the dynamic nature of danger, such as,
climate change, urban growth, disease, etc.
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
2, along with system 1 management units, implements
the safety plans received from system 3.
It informs system 3 about routine information on
the performance of the operations of system 1. To
achieve the plans of system 3 and the needs of
system 1, system 2 gathers and manages the safety
information of system 1’s operations. Moreover,
it also coordinates other local early warning coordination
centres (LEWCCs).
As illustrated in Figure 1, system 2 is interrelated
with systems 1&3. Table 2 presents some
examples of the information that flows through
these channels of communication.
system 2*: disaster- local
early Warning Coordination
Centre (leWCC)
System 2* is part of system 2 and it is responsible
for communicating advance warnings to other
early warning coordination centres and to key
decision makers. This action is intended to help
to take appropriate actions prior to the occurrence
of a major natural hazard event. Santos-Reyes
(2007) gives some details about how this might
be achieved. Table 2 presents some examples of
the information that flows through these channels
of communication.
system 3: disaster- functional
(Monitoring, assessment)
System 3 is directly responsible for maintaining
risk within an acceptable range in system 1, and
ensures that system 1 implements the organization’s
safety policy. It achieves its function on a
day-to-day basis according to its own safety plans
and the strategic and normative safety plans received
from system 4. The purpose of these plans
is to anticipate and act proactively to maintain the
disaster risk, arising from the operations of the
sub-systems that form part of system 1.
As illustrated in Figure 1, system 3 is interrelated
with systems 1, 2, 3*& 4. Table 2 presents
some examples of the information that flows
through these channels of communication.
system 3*: disaster- audit
System 3* is part of system 3 and its function is to
conduct audits sporadically into the operations of
system 1. System 3* intervenes in the operations
of system 1 according to the safety plans received
from system 3. System 3 needs to ensure that the
accountability reports received from system 1
reflect not only the current status of the operations
of system 1, but are also aligned with the overall
objectives of the organization. The audit activities
should be sporadic (i.e., unannounced) and they
should be implemented under common agreement
between system 3* and system 1.
As illustrated in Figure 1, system 3* is interrelated
with systems 1&3. Table 2 presents some
examples of the information that flows through
these channels of communication.
system 4: disaster- development
System 4 is concerned with safety research and
development (R&D) for the continual adaptation
of the disaster management system as a whole.
By considering strengths, weaknesses, threats and
opportunities, system 4 can suggest changes to the
organization’s safety policies. This function may
be regarded as a part of effective safety planning.
System 4 achieves its function according to the
safety policy of system 5; i.e., to maintain disaster
risk within an acceptable range in the organizations
operations. System 4 should sense, scan and
attempt to respond appropriately to the various
threats and opportunities identified in the system’s
‘total environment’ (see Section ‘the SDMS &
Its environment’ for details of the environmental
factors). There are two main safety issues which
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
system 4 has to deal with regarding the ‘total
environment’. First, the large broken line elliptic
symbol represents the ‘total environment’ of the
system (see Figures 1, 3&4). Second, system 4
should deal with the ‘disaster future environment’.
The ‘disaster future environment’ is concerned
with threats and opportunities relating to future
development of safety that may be relevant for the
organization. Therefore, the SDMS deals not only
with current safety problems, but also anticipates
or prevents future disasters.
As illustrated in Figure 1, system 4 interacts
with the ‘total environment’, systems 5 &3. Table
2 presents some examples of the information that
flows through these channels of communication.
system 4*: disaster- Confidential
reporting system
System 4* is part of system 4 and is concerned
with confidential reports or causes of concern from
any employee, about any aspects, some of which
may require the direct and immediate intervention
of system 5. This means that system 4* analyses
all information coming through this channel and
develops and plans actions to act upon what has
been reported so that these or similar incidents
or causes of concern do not occur in the future.
system 5: disaster- Policy
System 5 is responsible for deliberating safety
policies and for making normative decisions. According
to alternative safety plans received from
system 4, system 5 considers and chooses feasible
alternatives, which aim to maintain disaster risk
within an acceptable range throughout the life
cycle of the total system. Furthermore, these safety
policies should: reflect the safety values and beliefs
of the whole organization; address the anticipation
of disasters due to natural hazard; promote safety
culture throughout the organization. System 5 also
monitors the interaction of system 3 and system
4, as represented by the lines that show the loop
between systems 3 and 4 as shown in Figures
1&3. The safety policies that are deliberated and
decided by system 5 for implementation should
address, for example, the following issues:
• It should also promote safety culture
throughout the organization.
• Establishment of policy in development
planning: e.g., poverty reduction or eradication,
social protection, sustainable development,
climate change ‘adaptation’,
natural resource management, health, education,
etc.
• Promotion of disaster risk awareness
through education at all levels of the
organization.
Hot-Line
Figures 1, 3 & 4 show a dashed line directly from
system 1 to system 5; it represents a direct channel
of communication or ‘hot-line’ for use in exceptional
circumstances; e.g., during an emergency.
It represents ‘initially’ one-way communication
channel but they may become two way communication
channels between systems 1 and 5.
The sdMs & its environment
‘Environment’ may be understood as those circumstances
to which the SDMS response is necessary.
‘Environment’ lies outside the SDMS but interacts
with it (see Figures 1, 3&4). It influences and is
influenced by the system. Thus, it is important to
consider it. For instance, natural hazards such as
earthquakes, hurricanes, etc, threaten the system;
so that these hazards and the associated risks should
be eliminated or controlled. In addition, table 3
lists some ‘environmental’ factors that should be
considered by the SDMS.
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A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
Climate Change
There is evidence that suggests that emissions of
greenhouse gases are already changing our climate
(Aalst, 2006; Black, 2006; Helmer & Hilhorst,
2006; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), 2001; Trenberth, 2005); e.g., it is believed
that the global warning is the main cause of the
worsening of floods around manila Bay (Kelvin
et al., 2006).
National and Local Cultures
National and communities’ cultures on crisis and
response management should be considered by
the disaster management system, although caution
is needed to avoid simplistic and stereotypic
judgements. It may be argued that such behaviour
is likely to slow down response management and
consequently it may create time lags. The disaster
management system should take into account such
cultural behaviour when assessing risks associated
with, for example, an emergency response (Casse,
1982; Heath, 1995; Hofstede, 1980).
Learning from Past Disasters
Past disasters should be analyzed in order to learn
from them; i.e., to find out what went wrong and
what went right so that lessons can be incorporated
into the disaster management system. However,
there is evidence that shows that this issue has
not been addressed by local communities, governments,
etc.
Unplanned Urbanization
The complexity and sheer scale of humanity concentrated
into large cities creates a new intensity
of disaster risk. For instance, the fast and uncontrolled
growth of Mexico City with a population
of more than 20 million inhabitants is reflected in
dangerous construction of homes. In some areas
of Mexico City it is common place to see houses
built on steep hillsides (British Broadcasting
Corporation [BBC], 2006a, March 16).
Improper Construction of Buildings
Another contributing factor in disasters is related
to the materials and methods used to build homes
and other buildings. Very often in developing
countries public and private buildings are built
without taking into account potential hazards.
The above highlights the need on inherently
safer design houses against natural hazards and
these issues should be considered by the disaster
management system.
Technology
Technology is bound to affect organization’s
disaster management systems since there are usually
safety implications. The technology related
Table 3. Some ‘environmental’ factors that should be considered by the SDMS
External factors that may influence the performance of the SDMS
Climate change
National & local cultures
Learning from past disasters
Unplanned urbanization
Improper construction of buildings
Technology
Weather conditions after a disaster
Geographical location and settlements
Poverty
Cities in a continuous change
Lack of regulations
Isolation & remoteness
Armed conflicts
Epidemics
Politics
Corruption
Other
A brief description of each of the above is presented in the subsequent paragraphs.
13
A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
to tsunami early warning systems has already
existed such as the website http://www.prh.noaa.
gov/ptwc. However, the countries from the Indian
Ocean lacked of such systems and were unable
to prevent the tsunami disaster in 2004 (UNDP,
2005). This should be considered by the disaster
management system.
Weather Conditions After a Disaster
The weather conditions may affect the relief efforts
after an natural hazard and this may escalate into
disaster. For instance, heavy rain and snowfall
hampered relief efforts in Kashmir, where three
million people were left homeless by the South
Asian earthquake in 2005; roads were closed and
helicopters grounded by bad weather and landslides.
In addition, survivors’ tents were flooded
and these made the communities vulnerable to
disaster (BBC, 2006b, April 8).
Geographical Locations
and Settlements
The geographical location of cities may contribute
to disasters; i.e., those that have been founded in
highly hazardous locations. For instance, the city
of Lima, Peru, was founded in an area of very high
seismicity; the city has been severely damaged
by earthquakes, such as those that occurred in
1966 and 1970 (McEntire & Fuller, 2002). More
recently, the flooding of the city of New Orleans,
US, due to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 illustrates
the inappropriate location of settlements (Jackson,
2005). On the other hand, when the population
expands faster than the capacity of city authorities
or the private sector can supply housing or basic
infrastructure, informal settlements can explode.
For example, some 50% to 60% of residents live in
informal settlements in Bogota (Colombia), Bombay
and Delhi (India), Buenos Aires (Argentine),
Lagos (Nigeria), and Lusaka (Zambia). Similarly,
60% to 70% in Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania) and
Kinshasa (DR Congo); and more than 70% in Addis
Ababa (Ethiopia), Cairo (Egypt), Casablanca
(Morocco) and Luanda (Angola) (United Nations
Human Settlements Programme [UN-HABITAT],
2006). The above highlights the vulnerability of
these cities to disasters.
Poverty
Poverty may be another factor that contributes to
disaster risk. Moser (1998) argues that disaster
risk in cities is shaped by greater levels of social
exclusion and the market economy. Social exclusion
is associated to the high number of migrants
to a city where they are exposed at high risk from
disaster.
Cities in a Continuous Change
Cities may be regarded as complex systems which
are in a continuous change. They transform their
surroundings and hinterlands and these processes
may generate and create new hazards. For instance,
the destruction of mangroves in coastal areas may
increase hazard associated with ‘storm surge’; the
urbanisation of watershed through settlement, land
use change and infrastructure development may
contribute to the increase of flood and landslide
hazard; see for example, Zevallos (1996).
Lack of Regulations
Very often in developing countries, governments
have been ineffective in regulating the process of
urban expansion through both land-use planning
and building codes. Unregulated low income
settlements are the most hazard prone areas;
low building standards may be reflect a lack of
control, supervision, resources in order to build
resistant structures in such areas. It may be argued
that hazard prone areas are often preferred by the
poor because they may gain greater accessibility
to urban services and employment, even though
natural hazard risk may be increased. For example,
in central Delhi (India), a squatter settlement in
14
A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
the flood plain of the Yemura River has been inhabited
for more than 25 years (Sharma & Gupta,
1998; UNDP, 2004).
Isolation and Remoteness
Deficient rural infrastructure and its vulnerability
to natural hazards can increase livelihood risks
and food insecurity in isolated communities. For
instance, the Neelum valley with an estimated
160 000 inhabitants was cut off from the rest of
Pakistani-administered Kashmir and became one
of the most inaccessible areas hit by the South
Asian earthquake in 2005. The mountain people
of the valley are dependent on roads; however, the
massive landslides at the valley entrance made it
completely dependent on helicopters for supplies
(BBC, 2006b, April 8).
Armed Conflicts
According to the UNDP (2002) Human Development
Report, during the 1990s a total of 53 major
armed conflicts resulted in 3.0 million deaths
which nearly 90% are believed to be civilians. In
2002, there were approximately 22 million international
refugees in the world and another 20 to
25 million internally displaced people. The fact of
being a refugee or an internally displaced person
raises vulnerability. When the displaced settle in
squatter settlements in cities, very often they are
exposed to new hazards because dangerous locations
where they can find shelter. For example,
Afghanistan suffered three years of drought and
a major earthquake on top of decades of armed
conflict, creating a particularly acute humanitarian
crisis (UNDP, 2002).
Epidemics
Epidemic diseases may be seen as disasters in
their own right but they also interact with human
vulnerability and natural disasters. Following a
disaster, for example, the population is influenced
by the type of hazard and the environmental
conditions in which it takes place, the particular
characteristics of those people exposed to the disaster
and their access to health services. Natural
hazard events, such as, flooding or temperature
increase in highland areas can extend the range
of ‘vector-born’ diseases such as malaria. In El
Salvador, for example, local health centres were
destroyed by an earthquake in the year 2002; as
a result, people had to travel for hours to reach
medical care. Despite the arsenal of vaccines and
drugs that exist today, infectious diseases are on the
increase, particularly in the developing countries
(UNDP, 2002)
Politics
Politics also contributes to disasters. McEntire
& Fuller (2002) argue that the concentration
of political power may have limited the capacity
of local leaders and emergency managers to
undertake the steps they felt were necessary to
prevent calamity in Peru. For instance, officials
in the city and department of Ica asked the central
government as early as November 1997 to take
preventive measures or release funds, so potential
hazards could be addressed locally but this plea
was denied or ignored by the government (La
Fernandez, 1998a, February 3). However, when
the full strength of El Niño arrived a few months
later, Ica was largely unprepared to deal with such
event. The centralization of decision making was
regarded as one of the main reasons why the city
of Ica was devastated by the severe floods on 30
January 1998. Similar problems were evident in
other parts of the country as well (Fernandez,
1998b, February 5; McEntire & Fuller, 2002).
Corruption
Humanitarian relief is often needed in countries
which are usually corrupt. The risk of aid diversion
is high and very often occurs at any point in
the response by any or all of the actors involved
15
A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
in: donor contracting, public fundraising, by national
officials, UN staff, international NGO (Non
Governmental Organizations) and local NGOs,
and by recipients themselves (Willitts-King &
Harvey, 2005). The term “corruption” is used as
a shorthand reference for a large range of illicit or
illegal activities. Although, there is no universal
or comprehensive definition as to what constitutes
corrupt behaviour, the most prominent definitions
share a common emphasis upon the abuse of
public power or position for personal advantage.
Corruption can thrive in times of disaster and
when it is already entrenched, the possibilities
for abusing emergency aid are even greater. For
instance, the province of Aceh is among Indonesia’s
wealthiest in terms of natural resources; it
is also widely considered one of the most corrupt
provinces in Indonesia. It is believed that extortion
is being reported to be rampant across the
province, especially on main highways and carried
out almost entirely by the military (TNI) and the
police (Clark et al., 2005). It has been reported that
TNI was selling freely donated food to homeless
people immediately after the 2004 tsunami disaster
(James, 2006). Indonesian Corruption Watch said
that bureaucrats were reselling donated rice in
Aceh and aid supplies were been pilfered before
arriving in Banda Aceh (James, 2006).
It should be pointed out that most of the factors
mentioned above overlap and the order given is not
meant to imply any kind of order of importance
but it is simply a list of some of the factors which
might be considered by the SDMS. Other factors
may also be relevant.
fuTure researCh direCTions
A Systemic Disaster Management System (SDMS)
has been presented. The SDMS aims to maintain
disaster risk within an acceptable range whatever
that might be in the operations of any organization
(country, community, etc.) in a coherent way. The
future research includes:
1. The numerical assessment of the effectiveness
of the SDMS model by employing the
concept of viability. Viability has been defined
as the probability that the SDMS will
be able to maintain disaster risk within an
acceptable range for a given period of time
(see Table 1).
2. To apply the model to the analysis of past
natural disasters such as the following:
a. The Mexico City earthquake. On
September 19, 1985, at 7:19 local time,
an earthquake with a magnitude of 8.1
on the Richter scale struck Mexico’s
Capital City. It is believed that more
than 10,000 people were killed, 30,000
were injured, and large parts of the city
were destroyed. It is thought that about
6,000 buildings were flattened and a
quarter of a million people lost their
homes. The Mexico City earthquake is
being regarded as the most catastrophic
in the country’s history (Pan American
Health Organization [PAHO], 1985).
b. The Tabasco’s flood disaster. On
November 2007, torrential rains caused
the worst flooding in the southern
Mexican state of Tabasco in more than
50 years. It is believed that more than
one million people were affected. Some
preliminary results have been presented
in Santos-Reyes and Beard (2009).
c. The Tsunami disaster. On 26 December
2004 the biggest earthquake in 40 years
occurred between the Australian and
Eurasian plates in the Indian Ocean.
The quake triggered a tsunami; i.e., a
series of large waves that spread thousands
of kilometres over several hours.
It is believed that the disaster left at
least 165,000 people dead, more than
half a million more were injured and
up to 5 million others in need of basic
services and at risk of deadly epidem16
A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
ics in a dozen Indian Ocean countries
(UNDP, 2005).
These cases may help to illustrate some of the
features of the model such as:
a. The possible advantages or disadvantages of
the concept of relative autonomy (RA). That
is, RA may have the advantage in terms of
helping to make local organizations more
effective; e.g., in helping to try to get the
message to the people ‘on the ground’. On the
other hand, it may be problematic if the local
organization is corrupt, or ‘incompetent’. In
that case, it would be better to have a strong
control from outside (i.e systems 2-5), to try
to ensure the effective implementation of
safety policies.
b. The need for a direct channel of communication
from the NDO to System 4* (i.e., the
confidential reporting system, see Figure
1); that is, avoiding the need for people
‘on the ground’ to always go through the
Management Units (e.g., LDMU; see Figure
1), especially as a person ‘on the ground’
may be complaining about the LDMU (e.g.,
because of ‘corruption’ or ‘incompetence’ or
nepotism or partiality).
c. The decomposition of System 2. In the present
application, System 2 has been broken
into NEWCC (National Early Warning
Coordination Centres) and LEWCC (Local
Early Warning Coordination Centres).
However, it is not clear how the decomposition
of System 2 might be at the next higher
level of recursion; i.e., at international level.
The analysis of the tsunami disaster may
help to illustrate this.
d. The channels of communication’s effectiveness
or lack of it. It has long been known
that an organization’s communication system
has a significant impact on the organization’s
performance. Moreover, multiple distributed
decision-making may be impossible without
communication. The ‘Four principles of organization’
and the ‘Paradigms’ (see Table 1)
which are intended to give essential features
for effective communication and control
may help to illustrate the above.
ConClusion
The natural disasters described briefly in the introduction
section have highlighted that the existing
approaches to the management of disaster risk may
be inadequate in dealing with such catastrophic
events. In addition, they have elucidated the need to
improve radically the performance of the existing
‘disaster management systems’. A great deal of
effort has been made, by academe, international
organizations, and governments, practitioners,
to investigate and develop approaches to address
disaster risk. However, the approaches reviewed
in the background section may represent a step
forward to managing disaster risk but may not
be enough to address the management of natural
disasters effectively. Furthermore, it may be argued
that they still tend to address disaster risk from an
‘isolation’ point of view and this will ultimately
fail to fundamentally understand the nature of risk
(Beard, 1999; Santos-Reyes & Beard, 2001). That
is, the cause of a natural disaster may be found
in the complexity of the relationships implicit
in the physical location of the settlements, the
design of the houses, communication systems,
Early Warning Systems (EWSs), national infrastructure,
climate change, etc. These have been
recognised by some researchers, such as McFadden
(Kettlewell, 2005a, January 6), who argues
that: “there’s no point in spending all the money
on a fancy monitoring and a fancy analysis system
unless we can make sure the infrastructure for the
broadcast system is there….that’s going to require
a lot of work. If it’s a tsunami, you’ve got to get
it down to the last Joe on the beach. This is the
stuff that is really very hard”. Similarly, McGuire
(Kettlewell, 2005b, March 25) argues that: “I have
17
A Systemic Approach to Managing Natural Disasters
no doubt that the technical element of the warning
system will work very well but there has to be an
effective and efficient communications cascade
from the warning centre to the fisherman on the
beach and his family and the bar owners”. In order
to gain a full understanding and comprehensive
awareness of disaster risk in a given situation it
is necessary to consider in a coherent way all the
aspects that may contribute to natural disasters.
In short, there is a need for a systemic approach
to natural disasters management. Systemic means
looking upon things as a system; systemic means
seeing pattern and inter-relationship within a
complex whole; i.e., to see events as products of
the working of a system. System may be defined
as a whole which is made of parts and relationships.
Given this, ‘failure’ may be seen as the
product of a system and, within that, see death/
injury/property losses and losses to the economy
as results of the working of systems.
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You may notice that the solstices and equinoxes mark the beginning of their respective seasons, rather than the middle. This is because the Earth takes time to warm up or cool down. Therefore, the seasons lag behind their respective daylight length. This effect is called seasonal lag and varies depending on the observer’s geographical location. The farther one travels to either pole, the smaller the lag tends to be. In many North American cities, the lag tends to be about a month, bringing the coldest weather around the 21st of January and the warmest weather around the 21st of July. For instance, at the end of August, you may still be taking advantage of the last of the summer weather, dressing lightly, making one last trip to the beach. However, the date, on the other side of the summer solstice which brings the same daylight length would be approximately the tenth of April. Most people wouldn’t even be anticipating summer then. 
Every year, the Moon moves about 4 centimeters (1.6 inches) out from its orbit around the Earth. This is due to the tides the Moon brings to the Earth. The gravity of the Moon on the Earth distorts the Earth’s crust by a few centimeters. Since the Moon rotates much faster than the Moon orbits, the bulge pulls the Moon ahead and pulls it out of its orbit. 
Due to friction caused by the tides and stray space particles, the Earth’s rotation is very gradually slowing down. Estimates indicate that every century, the Earth takes about one five-hundredth of a second longer to rotate once. Around the beginning of the Earth’s formation, a day lasted about 13 or 14 hours, instead of today’s 24. The Earth’s slowing rotation is the reason we add one leap second once every few years. However, the time when our 24-hour system is no longer valid is so far off in the future, not many people have speculated what we will do when that time comes. Some reports suggest that we could add one extra duration of time on the end of each day, perhaps, eventually giving us 25-hour days, or change the duration of hour-length to divide the longer days into 24 equal pieces. 
Astronomer, Milutin Milankovitch, discovered, in the early 20th century, that the Earth’s obliquity, eccentricity and precession are not constant. Over a period of about 41,000 years, the Earth completes one cycle in which it goes from being tilted 24.2-24.5 degrees down to 22.1-22.6 degrees and back again. Currently, the Earth’s axial tilt is decreasing and we are pretty well exactly halfway through our descent down to a tilt of a 22.6-degree minimum, which we will hit around the year 12,000. The Earth’s eccentricity goes through a much more erratic cycle, with a 100,000-year period. The eccentricity of the Earth ranges from being around 0.005 to 0.05. As stated in item 8, it is currently 1/60 or 0.0166, but is currently decreasing. It will bottom out to around 0.006 in around the year 28,000. He conjectured that these cycles cause the ice ages. When the obliquity and eccentricity are particularly large, and the precession is such that the Earth is tilted directly away or directly toward the Sun at aphelion, excessively cold winters result in the hemisphere tilted away from the Sun with too much ice to thaw during the spring or summer. 
The Earth’s axis slowly spins like that of a top. Also, the ellipse forming the Earth’s orbit very gradually rotates, making the shape traced out by the earth around the Sun over many years form a daisy. Due to both types of precession, astronomers have identified three types of years: sidereal year, (365.256 days) which is one orbit with respect to distant stars, anomalistic year (365.259 days), which is the length of time it takes for the Earth to travel from its closest point (perihelion) to its farthest point from the Sun (aphelion) and back again, and tropical year (365.242 days) the duration from one spring equinox to the next. 
Fact (kinda): Earth really is flat.
The Earth’s axis slowly spins like that of a top. Also, the ellipse forming the Earth’s orbit very gradually rotates, making the shape traced out by the earth around the Sun over many years form a daisy. Due to both types of precession, astronomers have identified three types of years: sidereal year, (365.256 days) which is one orbit with respect to distant stars, anomalistic year (365.259 days), which is the length of time it takes for the Earth to travel from its closest point (perihelion) to its farthest point from the Sun (aphelion) and back again, and tropical year (365.242 days) the duration from one spring equinox to the next. 
Most people know that the Earth orbits the Sun in an ellipse, rather than a circle, but the value of the Earth’s orbital eccentricity is approximately equal to 1/60. A planet that orbits its sun periodically always has an eccentricity between 0 and 1, including 0 but excluding 1. An eccentricity of 0 means the orbit is a perfect circle with the Sun at the center and the planet orbiting at a constant speed. However, such an orbit is extremely unlikely as there is a continuum of possible eccentricity values. The eccentricity, in a closed orbit, is measured by dividing the distance between the Sun and center of the ellipse by the length of the semi-major axis of the ellipse. The orbit becomes increasingly longer and thinner the closer the eccentricity gets to 1. The planet always orbits fastest when it’s nearest to its Sun and slowest when it’s farthest from its Sun. When the eccentricity is greater than or equal to 1, the planet comes around its Sun once and flies back out into space never to be seen again. 
Fact: Sunrise/sunset times do not change direction immediately at the solstices. 
Fact: The Sun is not necessarily the highest at noon. 
